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The war, or wars, which affected southern Africa from the mid-1960s to the
1990s had a major impact on Africa's éléphant population and on the ivory trade,
quite apart from their effect on millions of people.
Since the late 1980s, évidence bas gradually emerged that large-scale poaching
and ivory trading has been more than just an individual reaction to circumstances
of poverty and militarisation. Elements of several of the many armies which have
taken the field in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and elsewhere have hunted
éléphant in an organised manner and have made officiai (though clandestine)
arrangements for marketing ivory. It has become apparent that the most important
element in a sub-continental reorganisation of the ivory trade during much of this
period was the South African Defence Force (SADF) and most notably the net-
works organised by its Chief of Staff (Intelligence). These networks encouraged
their allies in the Resistência National Mocambicana (RENAMO), the Uniâo
National para a Independência Total de Angola (UNTTA) and the Rhodesian
Selous Scouts to obtain and trade ivory, partly as a means of paying for South
African aid in weapons and other services, and partly as a technique of déstabili-
sation in itself (Ellis 1994:53-69).
South Africa's own security forces became directly involved in these wars in
1967-8, after Umkhonto we Sizwe (the armed wing of the African National Con-
gress of South Africa) had launched the Wankie campaign in north-west Rhodesia
together with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). South Africa sent a
contingent of policemen to fight in Rhodesia and to gain direct expérience of
counter-insurgency. Rhodesia was to be the training-ground of many later
counter-insurgency specialists, including the officers who set up koevoet (a
counter-insurgency unit) in Namibia and some who were later to organise the
police death-squads based at Vlakplaas (Pauw 1991:76, 113). The SADF main-
tained liaison officers with Portuguese armed forces in Angola and Mozambique
(Van de Waals 1993:208-12).2 There is some évidence that, from the early or
mid-1970s, éléments of the South African government and its security forces
began actively to encourage their allies in Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola to
acquire ivory and to seil it through South Africa. This seems to have been less an
individual enterprise than a systematic attempt to turn Johannesburg into the
centre of the wholesale ivory trade in southern Africa. Within a short time, the
South African secret services had succeeded in establishing Johannesburg as the
hub of the strategically vital trade. The économies of southern and central Africa
were — and still are — linked by long-distance trade-routes in high value com-
modities: not only ivory, but also rhino hörn, mandrax, gems and currencies
(Baynham 1992). Access to these trade networks gave South African secret
servants an entrée to valuable sources of information as well as of money.
For most of the period, little was known of South Africa's interest in the ivory
trade and related smuggling activities outside a very small circle. But there were
sufficient rumours in circulation for the SADF to hold an official inquiry in 1988,
which came to the unsurprising conclusion that allégations that the SADF was
implicated in the ivory trade were baseless.
The first really authoritative évidence that the SADF was indeed deeply impli-
cated in the ivory trade in Angola especially came from one of South Africa's
most experienced soldiers, Colonel Jan Breytenbach. Breytenbach joined the
South African Army in 1950, and five years later left to join the Fleet Air Arm of
the British Royal Navy, with which he took part in the 1956 Suez landings. In
1961 he rejoined the South African Army and became a paratrooper, eventually
being posted to work with Portuguese colonial forces in Angola. In 1972 he
became one of the founding officers of South African Special Forces, being the
first commander of 1 Reconnaissance Commando. In 1975 he went on to form
and become the first Officer Commanding 32 'Buffalo' Battalion, an auxiliary
unit employing largely South African officers and Angolan troopers, specialising
in service in Angola. He also founded and commanded 44 Parachute Brigade. He
retired from thé SADF in 1987, but bas continued to work in various security
jobs.3
From 1970, but especially after thé first South African invasion of Angola in
1975, Breytenbach spent a gréât deal of time on active service in southern Angola
and came to know thé région intimately. In November 1989 he caused considér-
able publicity in South Africa by giving an interview to the country's biggest-sell-
ing newspaper in which he accused the Angolan organisation UNITA of having
smuggled ivory on a huge scale for many years, in complicity with officers of the
SADF (Potgieter 1989). The interview reproduced below, carried out shortly
afterwards, gives considerably more detail of these allégations. The interview was
conducted with Colonel Jan Breytenbach at his home in the Cape Province on 8
December 1989. The interviewer was Ros Reeve (RR), who was working on
behalf of the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA). Col. Breytenbach gave
his unreserved permission for the EIA to use the contents of the interview in any
way it wished, and the EIA kindly agreed to its being published here. We have
edited the interview principally to avoid infelicities of speech. Where lengthy
passages have been omitted, they have been indicated thus: (....). Otherwise, the
interview record is presented as nearly as possible Verbatim, in the belief that it
constitutes a valuable primary source concerning the organisation of the ivory
trade in southern Africa.
Interview with Col. Breytenbach
RR: Can you describe what the situation [in Cuando Cubango] was like when yo
were first posted to the area?
JB: It was a military opération. Cuando Cubango was being used by SWAP<
[South-West African People's Organisation] as infiltration from Zambia int
Cuando Cubango, then north into Cunene Province and from there into Ovambc
land.








RR: And this was in '70?
JB: Nineteen-seventy. The idea was to find the possible routes. If you find the
possible routes then you have to find where the water holes are, because obvi-
ously they move from water hole to water hole when they are away from the
rivers. Now it was the first time I came into contact with the game situation in the
Cuando Cubango. We covered the whole south eastern part of the Cuando Cu-
bango below the Luiana River, as far as the Cuito River in the west and the
Cubango River in the south and the South West African/Angolan 'cut-line'.
RR: Were you commanding one of the battalions then?
JB: I was in command of Special Forces in those days. My Special Forces troops
were doing the job. We were covering this whole area for water holes, including
the Western Caprivi. Now in this area we found huge concentrations of game,
particularly along the Luiana River and then along the Luengue River, in the
Cuito and then along the Cuando. We were doing this in August/September,
which is the end of the dry season. The pans would be dried up, so all the animais,
the éléphants particularly, would flock to the rivers, where they could get water.
And there were literally thousands and thousands and thousands of éléphants in
this area alone, apart from other game, like sables and buffalo and so forth. I often
said in those days that in that terrain there was more game than you could ever
hope to find in the Kruger National Park. It was prolific, really it was, absolutely
prolific.
The Portuguese had hunting concessions there. They had some clients, you know
Americans, hunting there, but they only came in for a very short period of time,
because the whole place was covered in tsetse fly, so people didn't like it very
much.
Over the next number of years I worked in this area against SWAPO. I worked
with the Portuguese, not against FAPLA [Forças Armadas Populäres de Liber-
tacäo de Angola] so much, but against SWAPO. They had a garrison at Coutado
do Mucusso. They had one at Luiana, and they had a small platoon at Luengue.
We worked with these people, so I came hère fairly often, and the game was
prolific. The Portuguese did hunt for thé table, but there was no other sort of
poaching or big scale hunting going on at all.
The whole area in those days was completely devoid of any infrastructure. In fact,
Luiana was just a small little base, a few mud huts and so on. At Coutado do
Mucusso there were a few huts and even these had disappeared. All you find there
nowadays is just a burnt out truck. At Luengue there were a few huts and that was
it. I mean these are not towns as they are marked on the map. Just little dots on the
map.
I worked with Bushmen trackers. They knew the area very well. They also knew
about the game, and they knew what was going on. Throughout the seventies until
19761 was in there fairly frequently by virtue of my military opérations.
RR: And you were based in the Western Caprivi?
JB: The Special Forces had a training camp at a place called Fort Doppies in the
Western Caprivi. And I was in 32 Battalion. We established a base on the Cu-
bango River. I left the Special Forces in about '75, and then from '75 to '761 was
actually working with 32 Battalion. And then we worked from the Cubango
River, still in the Western Caprivi. I also deployed troops, in those years, up as far
as Vila Nova da Armada. I had troops by Xivonga. I had troops in Mavinga, and I
had troops up near Caiundo. In all these places, there was an abundance of game,
except when you got closer to the Cubango River, opposite Kavango.
Then I left for a while. I went to 44 Parachute Brigade. So I wasn't too much
involved in this part of the world again. And I came back again in 1982,1 think it
was. I went back into the Western Caprivi. I started hearing rumours about the
depletion of the game up here. When I was in the Western Caprivi, I established a
base on the Cuando River where I trained people in guerrilla warfare. I was then
working for Chief of Staff (Intelligence). We were working in support of UNITA.
I got involved with training of UNITA towards 1984.1 started training UNITA at
my place.
Frama Inter-Trading Company
Because I was working with UNITA, and because I was involved in the opéra-
tions supporting UNITA, I got to know about many of the inside things that were
going on in CSI — Chief of Staff (Intelligence) — who I was working for. I
knew, for instance, that they started up a Frama organisation, and I knew that they
were cutting teak in Angola for export, so they could make money with it. I don't
know what they were doing with the money because we were supplying them
with everything, with weapons, ammunition, military uniforms, even with rations
when they went fighting, with fuel, transport, lorries. All the logistical back-up for
a UNITA army was supplied by us, which they did not have to pay for. Hundreds
of millions of rands — and that I know as a fact — were spent every year on
supporting UNITA. They didn't have to pay the South Africans for providing
them. So where the money went to that they got for the teak I don't know. But
they started the Frama organisation which started running teak out of Angola.
And amongst others they had a saw mill at a place called Buabuata.
RR: When did Frama start up, about?
JB: I wasn't there when it started up, but I would say it started up in 1980 or late
1970s — '78, '79 — at that time. But when I started with CSI, Frama already
existed. And the people who were running Frama were then a chap, name of
Lopes, 'Lobbs', and a chap by the name of Maia. Lobbs was in Rundu. Maia was
in Johannesburg.4
We normally called him 'Lobbs', you see. But lots of other people call him Lopes.
I knew Lopes quite well. He lived in Angola. At the time when Angola collapsed
he came out with nothing, he and his family. But then he was employed by CSI,
first äs a pilot. We had an aircraft, and he used to fly me around when I was still in
32 Battalion, used to fly me around inside Angola to go and talk to Savimbi
(UNITA's leader) and so on, with his little aéroplane. He's quite a good pilot, but
then he got heart problems and he stopped flying. But he was then working for
CSIforasalary.
I'm now talking about '76/'77. So after I left 32 Battalion in '77, they must have
started up this Frama thing. Perhaps towards the end of '79 or thereabouts.
Anyway, Lobbs had this saw mill in Buabuata, and also one in Rundu I believe. I
never saw thé one in Rundu, but I saw thé one in Buabuata, at which they were
cutting teak. And they were running the stuff out in trucks which were not
supposed to be searched. The SAP [South African Police] were not allowed to
search them, the South African Army were not allowed to search them, nobody
was allowed to search them.
If you go south from the Cubango, you get to the Okavango Gâte, which is the
so-called 'red line'. There you've got a police post and a veterinarian services
post. There you are searched. Police. Obviously for whatever they want. Smug-
gling with marijuana or whatever, or diamonds, or ivory. And the veterinarian
people search your vehicle for méat, because the 'red line' forms the boundary
between the so-called 'foot-and-mouth' areas and the 'non foot-and mouth' areas.
So your vehicle had to be stopped and searched. But these guys, they all had a
card, so they could go through.
Well, I knew about the teak thing. It was open knowledge, official. But then I
began to piek up rumours about them also taking out ivory. Being a clandestine
thing, it was therefore quite easy to put anything in that you wanted to put in, like
ivory, like diamonds, or even marijuana, because nobody's searching you along
the way. You can go all the way to South Africa without being searched. It's an
easy way of getting the stuff through.
So that is what I thought initially: that they are making use of this channel. But
then I began to get other vibes as well from certain officers who worked for CSI. I
won't mention this one particular officer's name because otherwise hè may get
victimised. But this man came to me. In Rundu, CSI had a big base, supporting
UNITA. And Frama was also in Rundu, although not next door to it, but fairly
close to it. He came back from an opération in Angola, and he wanted to replenish
his ammunition. He walked into the CSI stores — not Frama stores, CSI stores —
to an ammunition box, to take out ammunition, opened the box and there were
tusks inside. So then hè went to another one, and more tusks, and more tusks, and
more tusks, and more tusks. He was then a young captain. Then hè went to his
senior, who was a commandant, a lieutenant-colonel, and hè said to him 'Sir, are
you aware of the fact that there are hundreds of boxes of ivory in our store?
Because I went in there to go and get ammunition and all I could find was ivory. I
couldn't find any ammunition, just ivory'. So this chap hauled him over the coals
and said 'You'd better shut up. It's got nothing to do with you. If you put your
nose into our affairs then somebody will sort you out'. This is a man working for
CSI.
Shortly thereafter hè was posted back to South Africa as suffering from hallucina-
tions because hè' s got battle fatigue. Anyway this stuff was then sent south, flown
out in boxes as dental equipment — which it probably was, dental equipment, you
see — but this time it went out. I don't know where it was flown to. It was flown
out by military transport, of course. I'm convinced that the air force didn't know
what they were flying out. Because I can teil you this: that the air force and the
army was never involved. They wouldn't allow themselves to get involved in
ivory smuggling. I mean especially the army, guys on the ground who operate in
the bush. Because we have lived in the bush all our lives, we learn to get a respect
for the bush and to have a love for the bush and the animais in it. (....) Same with
the air force. They don't do it. But these guys I'm talking about now are basically
people who are not fighting soldiers. It's a civvie who's put on a uniform.
RR: Chief of Staff (Intelligence), CSI?
JB: Yes. Most of them are civilians, you see. They get a degree, and so on, and hè
joins the Defence Force and hè puts on a uniform and now hè's a colonel, or he's
a major, or he's a brigadier, or he's a corporal, or whatever. But now he's got
status. But he's not a fighter.
Right, so he reported this to me. Then he was off to South Africa. He did a few
courses there. Then he was posted back to Rundu, but not to CSI, to the army.
Because the army had their headquarters there as well, called Sector Two Zéro,
thé army headquarters. They had nothing to do with CSI. In fact, they were not
even allowed to know what was going on with CSI, because CSI is Intelligence,
and being Intelligence they are always secret. And when you are secret you can do
ail sorts of weird and wonderful things without anybody knowing what you are
doing.
So he went to Sector Two Zero as intelligence officer in thé army. The CSI, Chief
of Staff (Intelligence), you could almost call like thé GRU in thé Russian Army.5
Then you get Military Intelligence. Every unit has got an intelligence officer who
works with tactical intelligence. Now this chap came to Sector Two Zéro to work
with tactical intelligence, but because we were working against SWAPO hè had
these agents on the ground. And he reported to nie that there are CSI people
involved with smuggling — with hunting — éléphants in the Western Caprivi.
RR: Where are we now, about? Mid-80s?
JB: We're talking about 1982/83, thereabouts. So, he went to this particular place
on the western side of the Western Caprivi, near a place called Bagani, and hè
went to the suspect poacher, who was a Bushman. He found a rifle, a hunting
rifle. And hè found tusks, and hè traced the rifle back to a particular officer who
was working for CSI in Rundu, by the name of José d'Oliviera. Now, José
d'Oliviera is a former Portuguese from PIDE [the Portuguese Secret Police],6
from DOS [the successor to PIDE].7 And he also had an aéroplane. So af ter
enquiries which he made, this Bushman was shooting éléphants and providing
[d'Oliveira] with tusks, but José was providing him with a rifle and the ammuni-
tion. And hè would fly these tusks south to Windhoek with his own private
aircraft. But José d'Oliviera also sät in the same compound where the other CSI
people sat, who were supporting UNITA. José d'Oliviera also tried to get ammu-
nition through the Defence Force, hunting ammunition, calibres which were fairly
unobtainable. So anyway, hè got the tusks, and hè got the rifle, and hè went to the
police. He reported to the police in Windhoek and said 'Now look, this man is
poaching, organising poaching in the Western Caprivi'. This was the story.
He was then a major, this fellow. So he went to see José d'Oliviera, and José
d'Oliviera said 'This has got nothing to do with you. You don't know what you
are doing. It is not poaching. But if you keep on putting your nose into this
business, then somebody much higher up than I will sort you out, [someone] in
the organisation will sort you out'. Anyway, so the case was squashed. The police
were told from a higher authority — I don't know who it was — to drop the whole
story. It wasn't prosecuted.
José d'Oliviera, shortly thereafter, disappeared. He went absent without leave,
AWOL. The police were looking for him for another reason. But they couldn't
find him. So then they went to CSI and asked: 'What has happened to José
d'Oliviera? We want to talk to him'. [CSI] said they don't know. He went on
leave and didn't come back. They don't know where hè is. But he's gone. He's
missing. And eventually I hear a story mat José d'Oliviera resigned from the
Defence Force. But, strangely enough, José d'Oliviera — by another source — is
sitting in Lisbon manning an office for CSI, where hè is forming a liaison office
between another organisation and Chief of Staff (Intelligence). And hè speaks
directly to a brigadier who sits in CSI, regularly. So he's still in CSI.
RR: Not RENAMO?
JB: I'm not going to say anything else. But this is what I'm saying: he's talking to
that organisation. Speaking to them as liaison officer. So there hè is, he's still
there. In other words, CSI says hè doesn't exist any more, he's gone out, but he's
still working for them. This comes from another source in East Africa.8
But these things began to add up. There was something stränge going on. Then I
heard that Lobbs had bought up a shop and service station in Katima Mulilo.
Managing it was a chap by the name of Coimbra. Coimbra has got two sons. And
they were both doing their National Service in the South African Army. Both
stationed in Katima. Now, I got information that Coimbra was collecting ivory
and diamonds from Zambia, and from elsewhere perhaps, which hè would send
through to Lobbs in Rundu. And then from there it would go south, along the
Frama pipeline. I had a sergeant. This sergeant was very friendly with one of the
sons. He brought me information. They were also smuggling mandrax from
Zambia.
So this sergeant of mine came back with information that they were smuggling,
amongst others, mandrax, and diamonds, and rhino horn, and ivory. By that time I
was appointed as a Nature Conservator by South West Africa Nature Conserva-
tion Department, so now I could do more. This was in 1985, thereabouts. So I
decided I was now going to infiltrate. This sergeant of mine was very friendly
with this one chap. He was obviously in a position where hè could supply ivory,
because we were in the Western Caprivi and we worked a lot in Angola. So he
approached them on my instructions, and he went to this chap and hè said 'Now
look, you know I want to buy myself a BMW and I'm looking for money. But I
can get my hands on ivory. If I bring you ivory are you happy to take it over?' He
said 'By all means, but you are talking to the wrong chap. Actually I spécialise in
diamonds. My brother, he's the ivory man. You must talk to him'. So he spoke to
the brother, and then they made arrangements that hè would bring out ivory from
Angola, which hè would then let them have and then they would smuggle it down
the pipeline, or whatever. Well, I knew about the pipeline, but they didn't say it
was the pipeline.
Then they started pestering him — this was 1986 — pestering him because he
wasn't providing thé ivory. I was now trying to get permission to take ivory and to
get him and this ivory into thé pipeline so I could get behind it. In other words,
perhaps we would hâve to shoot some éléphants to get thé ivory. The bureaucratie
organisation was a bit difficult but I never really could get round to getting
permission from Nature Conservation to shoot éléphants for this purpose. Obvi-
ously I had to get their permission. I can't just go and shoot éléphants. I'm
breaking thé law. So by the time I left nothing had happened.
Apart from that, subsequently I got from a police inspecter, a détective inspecter,
thé whole story. After I told him this, he confirmed that this was happening; that
he was, in fact, investigating thé whole thing, this police inspecter from
SWAPOL [South West African Police]; that this pipeline existed; that they were
smuggling ivory out from Angola, and from Central Africa along this Frama
pipeline.
At that stage I was still certain that thé people at the top didn't know, although
some may hâve known, like, for instance, José d'Oliviera. There may have been
renegade types who were trying to enrich themselves. But I was still convinced
that high up, they didn't know about this. In fact I informed my boss, because then
I was working for CSI. I said to them 'Thèse people are smuggling ivory, man-
drax, diamonds and rhino horn. This Frama organisation of yours'. I reported it to
a certain Colonel Snyman. But I was then about to retire from thé Defence Force.
I was already appointed then as Nature Conservator. They asked me whether I
wanted the job of park warden for the Western Caprivi. Three weeks later they
withdrew thé appointaient, on thé advice of thé Defence Force who said I would
interfère with their business. Although they knew before that time that I was
going to apply for this job, and I had told them many times, and they had given me
thé job, they stopped it.
I wrote a letter to the Chief of the Defence Force himself, General Geldenhuys, to
ask Mm what had they got against me, because I still didn't click what was going
on. He wrote me a letter back. He said Tve got no objection to you serving in thé
Western Caprivi as a Nature Conservator. I hereby wish you all the luck for thé
future and hope you and your wife enjoy yourselves in thé Western Caprivi.
Cheers. Much happiness for thé future. General Geldenhuys. The Chief of the
Defence Force'.
They reappointed me, and I flew regularly out from CSI to go and talk to thèse
people, and they withdrew thé appointment again, because I was getting now onto
their track.
The fact of the matter is that they were hiding something. Until I spoke to this
policeman, who told me the whole story, and he said 'What you've told me
confirms what we know'. He said to me 'As a matter of fact I thought that you
were one of them, otherwise I would hâve approached you long ago'. And then he
said to me 'But you think it's only Frama and some people just above them', he
said, 'but it goes very, very high up in thé hierarchy'. He didn't tell me who it
was. I didn't ask him because he was busy with investigation. I didn't want to
know, because I mean you can spill thé beans. I don't know whether he is still
busy with thé investigation. I don't know who he had in mind, but it seems to be
fairly high up, at least in CSI channels, where this rottenness was. How high up I
don't know. But he indicated to me that I would be surprised if I knew.
So this thing was used for smuggling ivory for UNITA. But now to get back to the
UNITA side of it. Now, in 19861 went back into this area again for the first time.
They were going to fight a battle hère at Cuito Cuanavale. For thé first time since
'76, basically, I went back into the Cuando Cubango. I drove from Mucusso ail
thé way up to Coutado do Macusso to a place called Lacoao, which is not marked.
It's a logistics base for UNITA. And then went along ail thé way up to Mavinga.
From Mavinga across to thé Lomba River. Then we went back to Mavinga, then
we went across. We were going to blow a bridge at Masseca. Well, this opération
didn't corne off. We came all the way back again. I covered about 4,000km,
backwards and forwards, driving around in this area, covering particularly this
area between Mavinga and thé Cuito River, and to thé north of it. And of course
also along thé south. And in thé whole area, where formerly there were thousands
and thousands of éléphants, I saw the spoor of five éléphants. And that's all I saw.
I didn't see anything else. I saw two reed bück on the Lomba River, and I saw a
sitatunga somewhere. And that same night I was presented with thé sitatunga
which had been shot by my UNITA bodyguard and given to us to eat. I think it's
thé last Mtatunga they shot in thé whole of Angola, quite honestly. One of the
rarest buck m thé world.
Poaching by UNITA
Now, I must also give you some other examples of UNITA's nature conservatio
efforts. I think this opération was August/September, if I remember correctl)
1986.9 (....) My base was just down the river from the 'eut line'. I had a base i
Kongola. Over a period of about three months I found eight hippos, floating dow
the river, badly decomposed, which meant that they had been shot fairly high u
river. We had three herds of hippo between us and the 'eut line'. So they couldn
have been shot from those herds, because I counted them regularly and they wer
too close to us. So these things must have come from quite a way upstream. Nov
this river is very windy. It' s got a lot of side streams and so the hippos are alway
in the side pools, very rarely in the mainstream. So, in other words, if you fin
eight floating down in the mainstream, a lot more must have been shot away froi
the mainstream who got stuck in the reeds, who couldn't get out into the mair
stream. So when I say eight, you can probably multiply that by about five at leas
if not more.
Now, recently with this Okahandja haul of ivory10 a lot of hippo tusks were foun
m amongst the tusks. Hippo tusks are actually a better quality than ivory from a
éléphant because it's denser.
Anyway, one day my wife and I went upstream into Angola, and we went for
picnic. There are some nice islands there. And while we were having the picn
they were shooting over our heads from the UNITA side. So I got angry and I g<
into the boat and I drove up to where the shots were coming from. I drove into
side stream and there were these UNITA's, four of them. They were armed wii
AK47s and were shooting at crocodiles. And there was this big hippo floating c
its back, legs in the air. I accused them of shooting this hippo, and they said n
they didn't shoot the hippo. This thing, well, they just found it floating. It was fi
of bullet holes.
They use AK47s. It's an automatic rifle. You put it on automatic and you fi
bursts. Look, UNITA has the worst shots in the world. I mean they can't hit tl
back side of a bus at five yards. So when they plough up the éléphants they u
automatic fire. They bring it down eventually. Just empty the magazine at it. No
you can imagine if they shoot into a herd, a number of them are injured. They w
get away, because the éléphants don't stand around to be shot at.
Anyway so now, they were shooting at the crocodiles who were trying to feast c
this hippo which they had shot. This was one of the hippos which was in a sii
pool, which had never floated downstream. And I was very angry about this
reported it to these people in Rundu. I said that 'Your bloody stupid people a
shooting all the hippos, and I found so many hippos floating downstream'. Ai
then they sent out a signal that it must be stopped, but only because I saw it
spotted it. Otherwise they wouldn't have done anything about it.
Another indication that there was a lot of shooting going on north of the bord
was wounded éléphant that we found south of the border. We found several, qu
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a number of them. Füll of bullet holes. And I can't even teil you how often that
you find them, you know, drag marks. Drag marks of an éléphant dragging his
leg, or something like that, coming from across thé 'eut line'.
The éléphant population starled to go down. Initially, in 1982 when I arrived in
the Caprivi, back from 44 Parachute Brigade, I got airborne with some nature
conservators in their helicopter. One day we counted 5 000 éléphants within about
a 5km by 5km area. There were lots of herds, but that's the most I ever saw in my
life. After that they started to go down. So thèse éléphants obviously were under
pressure in the Cuando Cubango and they were coming across. So thé éléphant
population was building up in the Western Caprivi. And then that also started to
go down. And the reason why it was going down was because the poaching
started to be carried out inside the Western Caprivi Game Park.
In 1986 or '87 I flew in a chopper from the Cuando to a place near Fort Doppies
and I counted in a lOsq km area, precisely 20 éléphant carcasses which had been
shot with the tusks taken out, inside the Western Caprivi. This was not any more
in the Cuando Cubango, this was now spilling over into the Western Caprivi. I'm
not saying that UNITA aren't in the Western Caprivi. What Fm saying is that the
focus was beginning to shift to where there were still éléphants left. These were
éléphants shot by people coming along the Cuando from the Western Caprivi,
poachers paid by Coimbra and his sons, although not openly. So now the poachers
were handing it over to an intermediary, a chap actually living near Kongola, and
hè would hand it over presumably to Coimbra, because Coimbra was actually the
collecting point. Now you must remember one thing, that these people rarely
would handle the ivory themselves. The ivory gets cashed and it gets taken out,
and they just handle the money. I mean a guy like Lobbs handles the money. But
all his subordinates, they handle all the stuff along the way. And then they will
take it through to Rundu, by various means. One means I'm going to teil you
about which they used, which I know about. I don't know what other means they
used. But he had a red Land Cruiser, Coimbra. He was always fiddling around
somewhere in the Western Caprivi. I found the spoor all over the place.
Now this red Land Cruiser was suspected of taking ivory through one night to
Rundu. So he loaded the stuff, ostensibly, and left. But in front of him moved a
military truck, and behind him moved another military truck. So it went through
the Western Caprivi, it went through Bagani, of course. The Cubango River, there
was a flow point there. I don't know whether they checked it there or not, but
anyway, hè went through there. The police knew hè was coming and they set up a
road block outside Rundu for him, because they wanted to catch him now with thé
ivory. It was Coimbra The military truck m front went through thé road block and
went on. The red Land Cruiser came m, stopped and was searched. They found
nothing m it. It went through. And then the last military truck also went through.
You know a military truck wasn't searched, and it also went through.
It was only later that thé police discovered that thé driver of the first military truck
was one of the sons of Coimbra, and the driver of the second military truck was
the other son of Coimbra. So obviously they were sending the first military truck
through to see whether it was going to be stopped and searched. It wasn't
searched, so they were safe. The red Land Cruiser was searched because they
were expecting it. And the third vehicle, which was the second military truck, was
also not searched, and it had the ivory on board. So, that's one of the ways they
did it. As I said, his sons were national servicemen in Katima Mulilo, and how
they managed to get these trucks, I don't know. Maybe they volunteered to go and
get some supplies or whatever, and they fitted in this whole trip with this Land
Cruiser. They went along as well. They were acting as a red herring. And there
were, they reckoned, something like 70-odd tusks on board.
A friend of mine, a commandant in 32 Battalion — his name was Jan [name
unidentifiable] — hè found in Rundu a cache of ivory with one of these FNLA
troops, working for Lobbs. Thirty-Two Battalion consisted of former FNLA
troops.11 Now some of them were discharged eventually and worked for Lobbs.
So he started to use some of them as poachers. And this man was found with, in
his back yard, 82 tusks on information which Jan, a member of 32 Battalion, got.
So he took this case to court and hè wanted this man charged. And that case was
squashed from higher up. Eighty-two tusks involved in this particular thing.
Another chap worked for Lobbs, and he also ran a construction Company. They
were constructing a road from Kongola in thé Eastern Caprivi, south. This chap
was Portuguese. In his kitchen, under thé floor, they found 76 tusks. They took
him to court. He got himself thé best lawyer you could get, because you couldn't
afford one from Windhoek, and he was charged for possession of ivory. He got a
fine of R50 for 76 tusks, which he paid gladly, plus thé lawyer's fée, and he also
gave thé lawyer a tip for several thousand rand, to show him how happy he was.
And this guy didn't have the money. So this money must have corne from Lobbs.
I mean it couldn't hâve corne from anybody else.
So this was the sort of thing that was going on thé whole time. Every time
something crops up, you know somebody's caught with ivory or somebody's
caught with this, that or thé other, then it gets squashed, or they pay a fine and
that's the end of the story. No problem at all. I'm not saying that thé magistrale
was in their pay. F m not saying that at ail, because this was a very clever lawyer.
Because in this particular case he pointed out that this guy couldn't be tried under
thé Nature Conservation Ordinance for South West Africa, because thé Eastern
Caprivi, up till 1976 I think it was, feil under the Transvaal. They were adminis-
tering directly from Pretoria — thé Eastern Caprivi — so therefore the Transvaal
Nature Conservation laws were applicable to the Eastern Caprivi. And nobody
had changed that by law or by another ordinance. It was still applicable.
Now, m the old days — 1910,1940 — the fine for possession of illégal ivory was
£25, you see. So he got away with a R50 fine. So there you are. This was the son
of thing that was happening all the time. So you could never bring anybody to
court. Guys who were caught in Tsumeb with ivory, and with dagga — marijuana
— they had 170-odd tusks. They went to court and paid a fine. End of story. I
think they also got six months, but six months is nothing. A fine is paid, six
months and that's it, and they're out. And they didn't say a word in court. They
didn't implicate anybody else.
Any way, so over the years, in the Western Caprivi also, the éléphants got less and
less. And right at the end, when I was already out of the army, I managed to get
one of my helicopter pais to fly up the 'eut line'. And I saw vehicle spoor coming
in from the north, across the 'eut line', into the Western Caprivi, stopping in the
Western Caprivi, and I found on that particular trip three éléphant carcasses which
had been shot from people coming in from the Cuando Cubango, in other words
from UNITA territory. This was right at the end, before I left (....).
RR: What do you know about the pipeline and the routes out? How far can you
follow it?
JB: I can follow it as far as Jo'burg, and that's it. Well, Pretoria, Johannesburg.
RR: Do you think there was just that one pipeline?
JB: No. I've got a suspicion that the same people took stuff straight from Zambia
over the Kazungula ferry, through Botswana, because there were also Portuguese
involved with that. Caught. And that was also a very small fine they got, by the
way.
RR: That was Vieira.12
JB: Yes. And through the border post to South Africa. I've got a suspicion they
are the same people. They were also running ivory from Eastern Caprivi, through
the control point in Eastern Caprivi. It's just north of the Chobe River, and you go
there through the Chobe National Park, through the check at Kazangula and then
you go south again. A guy was caught in 1983, '84. He had a truck which hè
brought up füll of vegetables to Katima Mulilo every week, selling the vegetables
to the local people there and then going back empty, so-called empty. But he had a
false bottom and they caught him with this ivory, something like 90-odd tusks in
one consignment, coming from Katima Mulilo. Obviously from Coimbra. They
were going also via Botswana (....).
Another incident I can teil you about, some time in 1987. The Directer General of
the Roads Department in South West Africa came to a brigadier in Windhoek
headquarters. It's now SWA Territorial Force headquarters. And hè said to him,
'Look these Frama trucks are coming through and nobody can stop them. I am
convinced that they are carrying contraband (....). Have I got your permission to
stop these trucks?' And hè said 'Be my guest. Stop them.' He said 'Fine', because
every time they show them a card they're not allowed to be stopped.
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And hè stopped a truck. Opened it. They found ivory. They wanted to take it to
court in Windhoek. This brigadier was called in by the genera! and jumped upon
from a dizzy height, and hè said 'You must leave this alone. It's got nothing to do
with you.' And the case never went to court. It was squashed.
RR: That was the only case you know of when Frama was actually stopped?
JB: Yes. I don't know how many trucks they searched before they got this one.
That I don't know. But they found this truck. They couldn't have been too long
because if they had been stopped and searched, somebody would have com-
plained. They would have been told 'Stop searching these trucks'. So they must
have got to a hot one fairly quickly.
RR: And you complained?
JB: Yes, I complained to this chap, and then they starled to move me out. Then I
complained to headquarters. I complained to the minister. And Rupert Lorimer13
raised it in parliament. And then they decided to have a Board of Inquiry.14 I
eventually told the Board of Inquiry the same as I've told you now. I wasn't
actually involved in stopping the trucks, or catching them at a road block or
whatever, or seeing the guy with the ivory. I got all my information from other
chaps, other people. I gave them the names of these people to go to, this Board of
Inquiry. They didn't go to any one of them. Didn't speak to any of them. Going
back, they said 'Well, there's not enough évidence to say that the Defence Force
is smuggling, or smuggling ivory'. So it was just a cover-up job as far as Fm
concerned. They didn't go to this major, for instance, who told me about José
d'Oliviera. Neither did they go to the policemen I mentioned — two policemen
involved with the inquiries.
RR: So it was a whitewash. Is that too strong?
JB: Well, they went through the motions that's all. And they did it in a few weeks,
and that sort of füll inquiry takes months (....).
RR: How many éléphants do you think have died over the years since this
starled?
JB: Well, somebody said over a 100,000 éléphants have been shot15 and I would
agrée with that.
Postscript
A spokesman for the South African Police in September 1993 stated that the
police had taken statements from Col. Breytenbach concerning the ivory trade but
found all of his évidence to be hearsay, and thus of negligible value. There was
évidence that the ivory Irade contmued, although ils exacl extent was not clear. In
October 1993, members of the South African Police Endangered Species Protec-
tion Unit seized 465 kilograms of ivory cubes in a container in Durban harbour.
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The ivory was said to have been of Zambian and Zimbabwean origin (The Citizen
27 October 1993).
There remains considérable doubt as to thé précise degree of involvement of the
SADF in thé ivory trade. At one point in thé interview published above Col.
Breytenbach suggests that ivory-smuggling was the work of a faction within thé
CSI only, using thé facilities of thé regulär SADF ("I can tell you this: that thé air
force and thé army were never involved"). At other times, ne suggests that thé
smuggling networks might hâve gone wider. He also hints that knowledge of
ivory-trafficking went very high up the military hierarchy. Certainly, knowledge
of such a délicate matter as this would have been highly restricted for both
operational and political reasons. And although our knowledge of exactly how the
SADF's covert smuggling and déstabilisation networks operated remains rather
vague, thé général impression given by Col. Breytenbach is consistent with thé
view that spécial opérations units involved in clandestine work operated as much
as possible on a 'need-to-know' basis, and made use of regulär SADF facilities
for logistical or similar purposes while avoiding thé SADF line-management
structure. For example, évidence presented in thé inquest into thé murder in June
1985 of Matthew Goniwe, a political activist, suggests that illégal opérations were
generally under füll control and required approval at thé very top of thé command
structure (Minnaar, Liebenberg and Schutte 1994:175-343). On the face of it, this
would certainly have been the case for such a complex and long-lasting opération
as the smuggling networks described by Col. Breytenbach.
Further clarification of this point would require extensive interviews with those
concerned and access to official archives. At the time of writing, the South
African government had instituted a judicial inquiry into the alleged smuggling of
and illegal trade in ivory and rhinocéros hörn chaired by Justice M.E. Kumleben
(Government Gazette No. 5408, Vol. 352, 7 October 1994).
Notes
1. We are grateful to the Environmental Investigation Agency and, especially, to Colonel Jan
Breytenbach for permission to print this interview. Place-names in the text have been identifiée!
where possible, particularly by référence to the map in Jan Breytenbach, They Live by the
Sword, Lemur Books, Alberton, 1990, and to Ministerie das Colónias, Atlas de Portugal
Ultramarino, Lisbon, 1948.
2. Van der Waals gives information on South African military assistance to the Portuguese
colonial army in Angola before independence. Van der Waals was himself Vice-Consul at the
South African Consulate-General in Luanda from 1970 to 1973, and later became a military
liaison officer between the SADF and UNITA.
3. Biographical information from the dust-jacket of Jan Breytenbach, They Live by the Sword.
4. The two partners in Frama Inter-Trading (Pty) Ltd were José Lopes Francisco and Arlindo
Manuel Maia. The Company was wound up in 1986, although both men continued in business
with new companies. See June Bearzi, 'Question Mark over Unita Supplier', The Star,
Johannesburg, 19 March 1990. The name 'Frama' appears to be a compound of the first
syllables of the respective last names, FRAncisco and MAia.
5. Glavnoye Razvedyvaatel'noye Upraleniye, Soviet Military Intelligence.
6. Policia International e de Defesa do Estado, thé Portuguese secret police.
7. Direcçâo Gérai da Seguranca (DOS). The successor to PIDE, which was disbanded in 19'
The DOS had an irregulär military arm known as Fléchas, which became thé inspiration for
later formation of thé Resistência National Moçambicana, RENAMO. See Van der Wa
(1993:208) and Flower (1987:300-302).
8. cf. Vines, (1991:38) who mentions an SADF liaison officer in Lisbon named Rosa d'Olive
This appears to be thé same person.
9. This refers to a UNITA/South African attack on Cuito Cuanavale in 1986, and not the m>
famous siège of the same place in 1988-9. See Bridgland (1990:17).
10. Brendan Seery, 'Ivory Gang Held: 980 Tusks Found', Sunday Star, Johannesburg, 17 Septe
ber 1989. Détectives of thé South West Africa Police arrested six men on 16 Septembei
Okahandja, in Namibia. They confiscated 980 éléphant tusks weighing over seven tonnes. T
was said to be thé biggest find of illégal ivory in history. At least two of the accui
subsequentiy fled the country in défiance of bail restrictions.
11. Frente National de Libertaçao de Angola, the nationalist movement led by Holden Robei
After the defeat of thé FNLA by thé MPLA in 1975, South Africa recruited some EN"
fighters and incorporated them into thé 32 Buffalo Battalion, which Col. Breytenbach ce
manded.
12. De Wet Potgieter, Tvory SwoopRiddle of Mr Pong', Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 16Octo
1988; June Bearzi, 'Ivory Mafia: Sinister Twist', The Star, Johannesburg, 29 October 19
The owner of a truck seized at Kazungula border post on 10 October 1988 with 382 eleph
tusks, 94 rhino horns and other contraband on board, Antonio Vieira of Johannesburg, \
eventually fined R6 000.
13. Member of Parliament and spokesman on environmental affairs for thé Progressive Feds
Party, and, later, the Democratie Party.
14. cf. David Beresford, 'South Africa Checks Ivory Racket Claim', The Guardian, Londor
September 1988.
15. An allégation made by Craig van Note of the environmental group Monitor in testimony to
US Congress in 1988. David Beresford, 'South Africa Checks Ivory Racket Claim'.
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